Statement on ROK–U.S. Joint Fact Sheet on Security Agreements

14th November 2025

Today (11/14), the governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States released a “Joint Fact Sheet” following the ROK–U.S. summit. The fact sheet includes agreements on the ROK’s investments in the United States, tariffs, increases in ROK’s defense budget, purchases of U.S. military equipment, the “complete denuclearization of the DPRK” and implementation of the 2018 Singapore joint statement, and U.S. approval for ROK to build nuclear-powered submarines. While the approval of nuclear-powered submarines itself—mentioned during the summit—raises serious questions, the fact sheet also contains numerous elements that entrench the long-criticized unequal nature of the ROK–U.S. relationship and threaten regional stability. The enormous cost as well as the negative repercussions for the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia are deeply concerning.

Above all, treating the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines as a fait accompli and expanding the alliance’s mission is a serious problem. Nuclear-powered submarines require not only massive financial commitments but also careful scrutiny regarding their regional impact, including relations with neighboring countries, and whether such capabilities are truly necessary for the Peninsula. However, the government has merely framed the project as a “long-standing national aspiration” or part of “self-reliant defense,” without offering a clear justification. What is clear is that, under the banner of “self-reliant defense,” acquiring nuclear-powered submarines paradoxically deepens ROK’s dependence on U.S. military strategy. The new fact sheet explicitly states that “the United States and the ROK will enhance U.S. conventional deterrence posture against all regional threats to the Alliance, including the DPRK” confirming that ROK, as the junior partner in the alliance, will see its mission expanded beyond the Korean Peninsula to the broader Indo-Pacific region. Such an agreement will inevitably have negative consequences for relations with neighboring countries and may worsen regional arms races.

The two governments also emphasized strengthening extended deterrence, the “complete denuclearization of the DPRK,” and “implementation of the Joint Statement of the 2018 US-DPRK Singapore Summit”, and enhanced trilateral cooperation with Japan—positions that are contradictory in themselves. Ignoring the fundamental reasons DPRK withdrew from the NPT and developed nuclear weapons in the first place, how can strengthening extended deterrence under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and agreeing to introduce nuclear-powered submarines possibly lead to North Korean—or broader Korean Peninsula—denuclearization? With dialogue and negotiations at a standstill, simply reiterating denuclearization without taking substantive steps to create conditions for dialogue is highly inappropriate and risks repeating the failures of past policies.

Serious doubts also arise as to whether the government’s excessive, giveaway-style increases in defense spending and promises to purchase large quantities of U.S. weapons are justified. ROK has pledged to raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP, purchase USD 25 billion in U.S. military equipment by 2030, and provide USD 33 billion in comprehensive support for U.S. Forces Korea. Decisions on defense budgets and arms procurement should be made with public consent based on national fiscal needs—not by yielding to U.S. pressure. ROK already allocates substantial resources to defense and bears excessive costs for stationing U.S. troops through direct and indirect support. Moreover, 86% of all weapons ROK imported over the past five years were from the United States, leading to severe dependence on U.S. systems and military strategy. ROK forces will inevitably remain reliant on U.S. defense contractors for operation and sustainment.

Despite these burdens, the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) has once again become uncertain, tied to “conditions” that may not be met during the current administration. The two countries pledged to continue “alliance-level cooperation” and accelerate efforts to strengthen “essential military capabilities” for OPCON transfer, while also agreeing to acquire advanced U.S. weapons and expand defense-industrial cooperation. Maintaining the old “conditions-based OPCON transition” framework essentially hands Korea another bill for U.S. weapons. In the past, this conditional approach has served as a pretext to indefinitely delay the transfer, since whether the conditions are met can shift in accordance with U.S. strategic priorities and the changing security environment. As a sovereign nation, ROK should not have its rightful authority bound to conditional requirements. The criteria and verification process for conditional transfer must be fundamentally revised, and a plan for unconditional OPCON transfer must be established.

Today, President Lee Jae-myung described the fact sheet as “the result of mutual respect and understanding based on the firm trust of the ROK–U.S. alliance.” But it is questionable how many people would genuinely view the outcome as mutually beneficial. Instead, the agreements only reaffirm the need for fundamental changes in the ROK–U.S. relationship. This latest deal will likely be remembered as one in which ROK abandoned “balanced diplomacy” and took yet another step toward deeper dependence on the United States.

📍Statement [See/Download]
📍Korean Version >>