미, 북한 핵물질 수출 정보 왜곡, 전달 (Washington Post, 2005. 3. 20)

부시 행정부가 지난달 초 아시아 우방들에게 전달한 북한의 리비아 핵물질 수출 정보는 북한에 대한 압박을 강화하기 위해 의도적으로 조작, 왜곡되어 알려졌다. 그것은 북한이 새로운 핵무기 보유국의 등장을 돕고 있음을 뜻하는 것으로 새롭게 제기된 중대한 문제였다.

그러나 이 문제에 정통한 두 명의 정부관리들에 따르면 그 정보는 미국 정보 기관이 행정부에 보고한 내용과는 다른 것으로 나타났다. 미국 정보기관은 애초 북한은 핵무기로 변환이 가능한 6불화우라늄(UF6)을 파키스탄에 공급했으며, 정작 리비아에 문제의 핵물질을 판 나라는 미국의 주요 동맹국인 파키스탄이었다는 정보를 전했다. 이들은 미국은 북한이 리비아에 핵물질을 파는 거래에 개입했다는 아무런 증거도 갖고 있지 않으며, 미국과 동맹국들은 북한과 파키스탄 사이의 핵물질 거래에 대해서는 오래 전부터 알고 있었던 데다 대부분 주권국으로서 당연한 사업상 거래로 보고 있었다.

북한을 고립시키기 위해 그 거래의 핵심 내용을 삭제하여 전달한 미국의 의도가 알려짐에 따라, 미국의 아시아 우방국들의 의심을 증폭시켰다. 북한은 미국의 리비아 핵물질 수출 주장에 6자회담 불참 선언으로 대응했다.

콘돌리자 라이스 국무장관이 동아시아를 방문해 6자 회담 재개를 위해 노력하고 있는 것도 당시 사태가 부른 균열을 봉합하기 위한 것으로 보인다.

백악관은 새로운 사실들이 밝혀졌음에도 미국 정부는 “우방들에게 북한의 핵확산 활동에 대한 정확한 정보만을 전달”했다고 말했다. 비록 파키스탄을 직접 거론하지는 않았지만, 미 정부 관계자는 파키스탄 최고의 핵무기 개발 과학자 칸 박사의 불법적인 네트워크를 통해 그 거래가 이루어졌음을 분명히 한다고 밝혔다. 그러나 파키스탄이 북한으로부터 파키스탄 정부 소유의 컨테이너에 의해 핵물질을 운반하였다는 사실에 대해서는 미 정보기관은 함구하였다. 이는 파키스탄이 알카에다 지도자들의 체포에 핵심적 역할을 하고 있기 때문이다.

2년 전, 미 정부 관리자들은 미국의 우방국들에게 북한이 6불화우라늄을 무기급 수준으로 전환시켜 주는 핵농축 시설을 개발하고 있다고 전했다. 그러나 중국과 남한은 미국의 그와 같은 주장에 회의적이었고, 북한에 압박을 가하는 것에 점점 부담을 느끼고 있었다.

미 행정부의 사실 왜곡이 언론을 통해 보도된 지난 달, 평양은 핵보유를 인정하고 6자회담 불참가를 선언했다. 미국은 북한의 6자회담 복귀를 설득하고 있지만, 그 성공여부는 별로 낙관적이지 않다. 북한은 콘돌리자 라이스 외무장관의 “폭정의 전초기지” 발언에 대한 사과 요구를 포함, 일련의 조건들을 제시하고 있다.

라이스 장관은 그녀의 첫 아시아 방문과정에서 눈에 띄게 부드러워진 톤으로, 제시된 조건들은 협상가능하며, 김정일 위원장은 그 기회를 잡아야 한다고 말했다.

(원문)

washingtonpost.com

U.S. Misled Allies About Nuclear Export

North Korea Sent Material To Pakistan, Not to Libya

By Dafna Linzer

Sunday, March 20, 2005; Page A01

In an effort to increase pressure on North Korea, the Bush administration told its Asian allies in briefings earlier this year that Pyongyang had exported nuclear material to Libya. That was a significant new charge, the first allegation that North Korea was helping to create a new nuclear weapons state.

But that is not what U.S. intelligence reported, according to two officials with detailed knowledge of the transaction. North Korea, according to the intelligence, had supplied uranium hexafluoride — which can be enriched to weapons-grade uranium — to Pakistan. It was Pakistan, a key U.S. ally with its own nuclear arsenal, that sold the material to Libya. The U.S. government had no evidence, the officials said, that North Korea knew of the second transaction.

Pakistan’s role as both the buyer and the seller was concealed to cover up the part played by Washington’s partner in the hunt for al Qaeda leaders, according to the officials, who discussed the issue on the condition of anonymity. In addition, a North Korea-Pakistan transfer would not have been news to the U.S. allies, which have known of such transfers for years and viewed them as a business matter between sovereign states.

The Bush administration’s approach, intended to isolate North Korea, instead left allies increasingly doubtful as they began to learn that the briefings omitted essential details about the transaction, U.S. officials and foreign diplomats said in interviews. North Korea responded to public reports last month about the briefings by withdrawing from talks with its neighbors and the United States.

In an effort to repair the damage, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is traveling through East Asia this weekend trying to get the six-nation talks back on track. The impasse was expected to dominate talks today in Seoul and then Beijing, which wields the greatest influence with North Korea.

The new details follow a string of controversies concerning the Bush administration’s use of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction. In the run-up to the Iraq invasion in March 2003, the White House offered a public case against Iraq that concealed dissent on nearly every element of intelligence and included interpretations unsupported by the evidence.

A presidential commission studying U.S. intelligence is reviewing the case, as well as judgments on Iran and North Korea. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence also is reviewing evidence on nuclear, chemical and biological programs suspected in Iran and North Korea.

The United States briefed allies on North Korea in late January and early February. Shortly afterward, administration officials, speaking to The Washington Post on the condition of anonymity, said North Korea had sold uranium hexafluoride to Libya. The officials said the briefing was arranged to share the information with China, South Korea and Japan ahead of a new round of hoped-for negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear program.

But in recent days, two other U.S. officials said the briefings were hastily arranged after China and South Korea indicated they were considering bolting from six-party talks on North Korea. The talks have been seen as largely ineffectual, but the Bush administration, which refuses to meet bilaterally with Pyongyang, insists they are critical to curbing North Korea’s nuclear program.

The White House declined to offer an official to comment by name about the new details concerning Pakistan. A prepared response attributed to a senior administration official said that the U.S. government “has provided allies with an accurate account of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation activities.”

Although the briefings did not mention Pakistan by name, the official said they made it clear that the sale went through the illicit network operated by Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist, Abdel Qadeer Khan. But the briefings gave no indication that U.S. intelligence believes that the material had been bought by Pakistan and transferred there from North Korea in a container owned by the Pakistani government.

They also gave no indication that the uranium was then shipped via a Pakistani company to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and on to Libya. Those findings match assessments by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is investigating Libya separately. Libya gave up its nuclear weapons program in December 2003.

Since Pakistan became a key U.S. ally in the hunt for al Qaeda leaders, the administration has not held President Pervez Musharraf accountable for actions taken by Khan while he was a member of Musharraf’s cabinet and in charge of nuclear cooperation for the government.

“The administration is giving Pakistan a free ride when they don’t deserve it and hurting U.S. interests at the same time,” said Charles L. Pritchard, who was the Bush administration’s special envoy for the North Korea talks until August 2003.

“As our allies get the full picture, it doesn’t help our credibility with them,” he said.

Pritchard, now a Brookings Institution fellow, and others had initially raised questions about the Libya connection when it became public last month. No one in the administration has been willing to discuss the uranium sale publicly.

In testimony to Congress last month, CIA Director Porter J. Goss spoke extensively about North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and capabilities. But he gave no indication the intelligence community believed that North Korea had supplied nuclear materials to Libya, that it was capable of producing uranium hexafluoride or that it was a member of the nuclear black market.

Two years ago, U.S. officials told allies that North Korea was trying to assemble an enrichment facility that would turn uranium hexafluoride into bomb-grade material.

But China and South Korea, in particular, have been skeptical of those assertions and are becoming increasingly wary of pressuring North Korea.

The National Security Council briefings in late January and early February, by senior NSC officials Michael J. Green and William Tobey, were intended to do just that by keeping the spotlight solely on North Korea.

Pakistan was mentioned only once in the briefing paper, and in a context that emphasized Pyongyang’s guilt. “Pakistani press reports have said the uranium came from North Korea,” according to the briefing paper, which was read to The Post.

After initial press reports about the briefing appeared last month, Pyongyang announced that it possessed nuclear weapons and would not return to the six-party talks.

Pritchard said North Korea’s reaction was “absolutely linked” to the Green-Tobey trip.

The United States tried to persuade North Korea to return to the talks, but without success. The North Korean leadership responded with a list of conditions, including a demand that Rice apologize for calling it an “outpost of tyranny.”

During the first stop on her Asian tour, Rice used noticeably softer language on North Korea, telling a Tokyo audience that the U.S. offer was open to negotiation, and that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il should grab the opportunity.